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STUDENT NOTES
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE-RELEASE OF A VOLUNTARY
PATIENT FROM NARCOTIC FARM
Congress passed an act entitled "An act to establish two United
States narcotic farms for the treatment of persons addicted to the
use of habit-forming narcotic drugs who have been convicted of
offenses against the United States, and for other purposes".' After
certain provisions in regard to those inmates who are criminal
offenders, the act provides that "Any person, except an unconvicted
alien, addicted to the use of habit-forming narcotic drugs, whether
or not he shall have been convicted of an offense against the United
States, may apply to the Secretary of the Treasury or his authorized
representative, for admission to a United States narcotic farm ...
No such addict shall be admitted unless he voluntarily submits to
treatment for the maximum amount of time estimated by the Surgeon
General of the Bureau of the Public Health Service as necessary to
effect a cure. . . . And provided further, that any person who
voluntarily submits himself for treatment at a United States narcotic
farm shall not forfeit or abridge thereby any of his rights as a citizen
of the United States; nor shall such submission be used against him
In any proceeding in any court, and that the record of his voluntary
commitment shall be confidential and not divulged". In Ex parte
Loyd,2 the petitioner had been admitted to the federal narcotic farm
in pursuance of the act for the purpose of receiving treatment for
addiction to the use of narcotic drugs after contracting to submit to
confinement for the period estimated by the Surgeon General to be
necessary to effect his cure, or until he had ceased to be an addict.
Before the period stipulated in the agreement had expired, and while
the petitioner remained an addict, he asked to be released. Those in
charge of the narcotic farm refused to release him, and he petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner was granted his freedom.
In view of the ever increasing tendency toward institutional care
of the unfit, together with other questions of social importance involved, this case becomes an important one. Since cases involving
this situation are few, there being but one case cited in the opinion,
it becomes important that the most desirable result be reached.
In deciding that Lloyd should be granted his freedom the court
relied largely upon the Thirteenth Amedment to the United States
Constitution. The court reasoned that if Lloyd were forced to remain
an inmate against his will that the "involuntary servitude" clause
of that Amendment would be violated.
145 Stat. 1085, 21 U. S. C. A. 221-237 (1929).
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Aside from any of the specific provisions of the narcotic farm
statute, a rule which allows a drug addict, who has agreed to confinement for the purpose of cure, to regain his liberty and to roam at
large, altho perhaps based upon sound legal reasoning, Is not advantageous from the standpoint of the sociologist. On the contrary,
it has been proved that the best interests of society are served by
segregation and institutionalization of the unfit. It will not be contended by anyone knowing of the horrors of drug addiction that every
possible means should not be exerted to effect the resurrection of a
victim. As long as an addict remains at large, he will have access to
drugs; and as long as he has access to drugs, there can be no cure.
Cure may be effected solely by confinement, the only method possible
to repress the victim's irresistible urge to procure more of the drug,
which urge he may easily gratify so long as he is free to frequent
the places where it is dispensed.
As authority for the conclusion reached, the court cites the New
York case In Matter of Walter Baker.3 In this case Baker signed an
agreement to stay in an inebriate asylum for one year, during which
time he was to pay for his board and nursing, and to pay in advance
for six months treatment, and at the expiration of that six-month
period to pay a similar sum in advance for the remaining six months.
After having paid the first sum and at the conclusion of the first sixmonth period, Baker notified the superintendent of the institution that
he could no longer remain, nor pay for his board and treatment. Despite these considerations the superintendent refused to release
Baker, who thereupon applied to the court for a writ of habeas corpus,
which was granted. It is submitted that with regard to social consequences, it might be feasible to permit one addicted to the use of
alcohol to remain at large, while it is doubtful whether it is ever
advisable to allow a user of narcotic drugs to remain at large.
The chief ground of the decision in the New York case as in
the Lloyd case pertained to an asserted violation of the "involuntary
servitude" clause in the Thirteenth Amendment. Numerous decisions
involving an interpretation of this part of the Constitution have declared that adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment was an outcome
of the Civil War, intended primarily to abolish slavery, and was also
intended by the words "involuntary servitude" to prevent Mexican
peonage and Chinese coolie trade, lest their operations might develop
into conditions of actual slavery. The Amendment was not intended
to introduce any new or novel doctrine with respect to services which
had from time immemorial been treated as exceptional. Furthermore,
in determining what types of servitude were meant to be included
within the prohibition, the Supreme Court has said, "We know of
no better answer to make than to say that service which has from
time immemorial been treated as exceptional shall not be regarded
as within its provisions. '
829 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 485 (1865).
'Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 17 S. Ct. 326, 41 L. Ed. 715
(1896).
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In furtherance of the principle laid down in these cases, the
courts have often considered certain enforced services as without the
prohibition of this amendment. Where sailors who had deserted and
were arrested and forcibly placed on board their vessel sought relief
through habeas corpus, the Court said, "The question whether these
statutes (relating to enforced services by deserting seamen) conflict
with the Thirteenth Amendment, forbidding slavery and 'involuntary
servitude' depends on the construction to be given to the term 'involuntary servitude'. Does the epithet 'involuntary' attach to the
word 'servitude' continuously, and make illegal any service which
becomes involuntary at any time during its existence; or does it attach only t the inception of the servitude and characterize it as unlawful because unlawfully entered into? If the former be the true
construction, then no one, not even a soldier, sailor, or apprentice,
can surrender his liberty, even for a day; and the soldier may desert
his regiment upon the eve of battle, or the sailor abandon his ship
at any intermediate port or landing, or even in a storm at sea, provided only that he can find means of escaping to another vessel. If
the latter, than an individual may, for a valuable consideration, contract for the sarrender of personal liberty for a definite time and for
a recognized purpose, and subordinate his going and coming to the
will of another during the continuance of the contract; not that all
such contracts would be lawful, but that a servitude which was know5
ingly and wilfully entered into could not be termed involuntary."
If we accept the doctrine that the prohibition is applicable to
involuntary services other than those involving slavery, peonage, and
the Chinese coolie trade, there remains the fact that various types of
involuntary service still do not come within its provisions. This conclusion is made evident by the exception made in regard to seamen
in the above quoted case. Exceptions have also been made in regard to
involuntary service as imposed by the acts passed during the war
compelling all able-bodied men to be gainfully employed. In Angelus
v. Sullivan the court said, "The Conscription Act does not violate the
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, providing that neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime,
shall exist within the United States, as the purpose of that amendment is to abolish slavery and to make peonage impossible, and men
drafted into military or naval service are not held in slavery nor involuntary servitude within the meaning of the amendment. Quoting
from Butler v. Perry, 'The term involuntary servitude was intended
to cover forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery, which
In practical operation would tend to produce like undesirable results' ".
The chief reason assigned for holding the "gainfully employed"
and the "draft acts" constitutional results from the extreme emergency created by the war situation, and it is indeed fortunate that
that document permits of such elastic interpretation, as it has often
Ibid.
'246 Fed. 54 (1917).
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been proved that every contingency can not be specifically provided
for. It seems that the vast public interest involved in securing an
adequate national defense offsets any notion of involuntary servitude
when the servitude imposed pertains to any phase of this national
defense. It would seem that in curtailing the drug menace, there is
also a public interest involved, differing more in kind than in degree.
It requires but little reflection to perceive that unsurpassed activity
of the forces of drug addiction would wreak grave social consequences, consequences calculated to motivate alarm and deference
equal to that incited by the exigencies of war. This contention is
borne out and emphasized by the definition of a drug addict as defined
by the Narcotic Farm Act under which the Lloyd case was decided:
"The term 'addict' means any person who habitually uses any habitforming narcotic drug . . . so as to endanger the public morals,
health, safety, or welfare, or who is or ;has been so far addicted to the
use of such habit-forming drugs as to have lost the power of selfcontrol with reference to his addiction".'
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In an election held in a fourth class city in Kentucky, the certificate of the County Board of Election Commissioners filed with the
common council showed that the plaintiff had received a majority of
the votes cast for the office of councilman. He appeared at the proper
place, took the required oath and assumed his duties as an authorized
member of that board. The statute provides that, "The board . . .
shall judge of the eligibility and election returns of its members".'
Accordingly a contest was filed by his opponent before the common
council. It asked that the plaintiff be declared ineligible to hold the
office, and that his opponent be given the certificate of election. Plaintiff entered his answer and denial, but before the matter proceeded
further the attorney for the contestant entered his motion for a simple
dismissal. The order by the council allowing the motion declared
further that the plaintiff had been duly elected. Four months later,
represented by the same attorney, the contestant appeared before the
council and stated that he had not advised or consented that the contest be dismissed, and that it had been done without his knowledge.
He asked that the order of dismissal be set aside. This was done and
a hurried trial resulted in a decision favorable to him. He was immediately sworn in as councilman, replacing plaintiff, and this action
was entered in a circuit court of that state asking that he be restrained from in any way interfering with the plaintiff in his office
as councilman. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in approving the
judgment of the trial court in granting the relief sought, said, In the
concluding paragraph of its opinion, "the order of the council made
on January 28, 1936, seating Hughes and determining that he had
T21 U. S. C. A. 221(b).

